

## THE COMPLEAT ANGLER: OBSERVATIONS ON THE RISE OF PEISISTRATOS IN HERODOTOS (1.59–64)

ἐρριπται δ' ὁ βόλος, τὸ δὲ δίκτυον ἐκπεπέτασται,  
θύννοι δ' οἰμήσουσι σεληναίης διὰ νυκτός.

The cast<sup>1</sup> is made, the net outspread,  
The tunnies will rush headlong<sup>2</sup> through the moonlit night.

The Acarnanian *chrēsmologos* Amphilytos spoke the verses to Peisistratos just before the battle of Pallene in 546 B.C.<sup>3</sup> They contain a prediction of imminent victory for Peisistratos and total defeat for the Athenians. The Athenians will be routed and deprived of political self-determination, while the victory will restore to Peisistratos the tyranny from which he was twice forced, 'rooting' it once for all. Of course, all of this appears quite evident from the narrative.<sup>4</sup> But as the verses form part of

<sup>1</sup> Although βόλος has been taken by many to mean 'small casting net' (*iaculum*) (cf. J. E. Powell, *Herodotus*, i [Oxford, 1949], p. 29 ['net']; W. Jankowski and H. A. Stoll, *Die Novellen und Anekdoten des Herodots* [Leipzig, 1968], p. 53 ['Garn']; and A. de Sélincourt, *Herodotus. The Histories*<sup>2</sup> [Harmondsworth, 1972], p. 64 ['net'], 'cast' or 'throw' (LSJ s.v. βόλος; cf. G. Rawlinson, *The Histories of Herodotus*, i [New York, 1859], p. 153, and D. Grene, *The History of Herodotus* [Chicago, 1987], p. 60) seems a better translation here. Tunny-fishing was generally a large scale enterprise (Ael. *NA* 13.16) with the rather large tunnies (cf. Plin. *NH* 9.44; cf. also W. Radcliffe, *Fishing from the Earliest Times* [London, 1921], p. 100 with a reproduction of a pottery-painting of a tunny; and D'Arcy Thompson, *A Glossary of Greek Fishes* [Oxford, 1947], p. 81) netted usually not singly, but in shoals: Peisistratos will 'net' the entire Athenian army in one action, not piecemeal, as the description of the tunnies' swimming indicates (see n. 2).

<sup>2</sup> οἰμήσουσι, connotes something of the order of *impetu feruntur* (as 'of a hawk rushing upon a dove' [see D. W. Turner (*Notes on Herodotus* [Oxford, 1848], p. 30), citing *Il.* 22.140; cf. also *Il.* 22.308, 311]). The word here has been translated as 'launch into (sc. the net)' or 'rush headlong': cf. Ph. LeGrand, *Herodote. Histoires*, i (Paris, 1970), p. 68: 's'y précipiteront'; L. Humbert, *Histoires*, i (Paris, 1879), p. 36: 's'y jetteront en "foule"'; cf. also Jankowski and Stoll (n. 1), p. 53: 'stürmen hinein'. 'Swoop, swoop' (Grene [n. 1] 60) is infelicitous when applied to fishes; 'come shoaling' (Powell [n. 1], p. 29) too bland. The 'temptation' of D. J. R. Williams ('Herakles, Peisistratos and the Alcmeonids', in *Image et Céramique grecque [Actes du Colloque de Rouen, 25–26 Novembre 1982 (Rouen, 1983)]* p. 134 n. 21, to emend οἰμήσουσι to ὑπνώσσουσι should be categorically resisted, since it is without authority of any kind. On tunnies and pelamys 'launching into' nets see Opp. *Hal.* 3.646 and 4.570.

<sup>3</sup> The manuscript reading Ἀκαρνάν is sound: that Amphilytos was an Acarnanian and not an Acharnian (Valckenauer) is all but certain and no prohibition to his becoming an Athenian in the aftermath of Pallene (Stein; cf. Turner [n. 2], p. 30; cf. P. H. Larcher, *Notes on Herodotus* [London, 1829], pp. 84–5; LeGrand [n. 2], p. 68 [on 62, 16]). Perhaps more significant is the description of Amphilytos as an 'oracle-monger', or 'soothsayer', but not a *mantis*, as his fellow-countryman Megistias is described (Hdt. 7.219.1). It is possible that this has something to do with Peisistratos' reputation as a 'Bakis' (cf. schol. Ar. *Pax* 1071; W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* [Oxford, 1912], i.85; J. Kirchner, *Die Funktion der Orakel im Werke Herodots* [Göttingen, 1965], p. 70 n. 1; LeGrand [n. 2], p. 68 n. 1) and with his 'read' of Amphilytos' verses: see below.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. for example, A. H. Sayce, *The Ancient Empires of the East: Herodotus*, i–iii (London, 1883), p. 35 n. 1.

Herodotos' account of Peisistratos' ascent to power they amount to much more, for they constitute penultimate proof of Peisistratos' irresistibility (and his tyranny's inevitability), a recurrent theme in Herodotos' *logos*, but one which was undoubtedly encouraged by his Athenian sources as a means of explaining how the Athenians were forced to yield the tyranny. Indeed, the theme of irresistibility helps to excuse the Athenians for being overcome; as much of the *logos*, which is historically quite vague, it is a reaction to fact, not factual itself.

Two attributes account for Peisistratos' irresistibility in Herodotos. Divine sponsorship enters the *logos* almost simultaneously with Peisistratos. The prodigy of Hippokrates' pots overboiling firelessly at Olympia earns immediate disapprobative notice and dour instruction from the bystanding Spartan sage Chilon, who strongly admonishes Hippokrates to produce no children (1.59.2). Chilon's presence at Olympia, as Solon's at Sardis, was contrived for dramatic and ironic moment, for Chilon was of a younger generation than Hippokrates.<sup>5</sup> It was his reputation which mattered in any case, for even if Chilon's fame as 'tyrant-looser' (Rylands Papyrus 18, col. 2, lines 17–22) were not implicit in his exchange with Hippokrates, his remarkable wisdom and prescience, later noted by Herodotos (7.235.2), were certainly well-known to the Athenians.<sup>6</sup> His 'read' of the prodigy in thus unerring: his instructions to Hippokrates are dictated by the negative force he (and everyone) knows Peisistratos will become obviously as tyrant of Athens, and are stated just after Herodotos had introduced the *logos* by noting that Athens was 'held and rent apart' by the tyranny of Peisistratos.<sup>7</sup> Chilon's austere monition amounts to a prediction which in substance almost exactly matches the Pythia's more straightforward utterances to the Corinthian Eëtion about his son Kypselos, what he will become and what he will do as tyrant of Corinth.<sup>8</sup> Peisistratos' destiny is shaped by divinity.

Peisistratos' second irresistible attribute is his surpassing intelligence, which repeatedly and easily overcomes the Athenians. Peisistratos' debut of cunning (1.59.4) is a complete success: the apparently unwitting Athenians in Assembly voted the political parvenu the means to subdue them after they were taken in by his trick of self-wounding. A bodyguard of club-bearers was duly granted by the Assembly for Peisistratos' protection which then assisted him in both seizing and holding the Akropolis and so in establishing the first tyranny (Hdt. 1.59.4–5).<sup>9</sup> When thereafter Peisistratos was driven from power, he nevertheless managed a rapid return by allying with the established city-politician and powerbroker, Megakles. This return, too,

<sup>5</sup> Diog. Laert. 1.68 dates Chilon's ephorate to 560–557, much later, of course, than the birthdate of Peisistratos; cf. How and Wells (n. 3), i.80–1.

<sup>6</sup> Chilon's warning about Kythera is almost certainly anachronized from the fifth century, perhaps even dates to the Archidamian War. It is reminiscent of Epimenides' pronouncement on the future perniciousness of Mounychia (Plut. *Sol.* 12.10). Cf. H.-F. Bornitz, *Herodot-Studien* (Berlin, 1968), pp. 10–12.

<sup>7</sup> Hdt. 1.59.1; the agent of both participles is Peisistratos: cf. R. A. McNeal, ed. Herodotus. *Book I* (Lanham, Maryland, 1986), pp. 132–3; How and Wells (n. 3), i.80; Bornitz (n. 6), pp. 19–23 and n. 42.

<sup>8</sup> Hdt. 5.92.β 2–3, ε 2; see J. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 186–9; Bornitz (n. 6), pp. 11–13 (especially 12 n. 15).

<sup>9</sup> The substitution of *club*-bearers for *spear*-bearers, which many take to be reflective of the truth (cf., for example, How and Wells [above, n. 3], i.82; J. Boardman, 'Herakles, Peisistratos and sons', *RA* [1972], 57–72, pp. 61ff.; and even R. M. Cook, 'Pots and Pisistratan Propaganda', *JHS* 107 [1987], 167–9, p. 168) reads very much like imperfect apology in Herodotos: how *astoi* carrying clubs could help the outlander Peisistratos take the Akropolis against opponents armed with spears and shields has never been demonstrated, but *korunephoroi* euphemizes the awarding of a bodyguard by the citizens.

involved a trick, the notorious Athena/Phye ruse, which in the appraisal of Herodotos, was the 'silliest business' of which he had ever heard.<sup>10</sup> For their part, the Athenians either accepted the sham outright or went along with it, but, in any case, yielded the tyranny to Peisistratos once more and without resistance.<sup>11</sup>

It is very possible that the Athenians of the sixth century believed Peisistratos' extraordinary intelligence to be an offshoot of his divine patronage, that he was in fact sponsored by Athena. (He may have alluded to a connection between himself and Herakles and have been reckoned something of an Odysseus by the Athenians. Both, of course, were special favourites of Athena.)<sup>12</sup> A contemporary reverberation of belief in such patronage could well be the Athena/Phye pageant, which, quite contrary to Herodotos' disdainful estimation of it, the earlier Athenians can have taken seriously.<sup>13</sup> If that is true, then Peisistratos' further attempts at propaganda make much greater sense: his political power was to be perceived as a partnership between himself and the goddess, a very fruitful association for Peisistratos wherewith to establish and maintain his authority among the Athenians.<sup>14</sup> Howsoever we regard Herodotos' estimation of Athena/Phye, we must remember that the Athenians kept and transmitted this and such stories and they would hardly have done so to appear foolish.

The theme of the tyranny's inevitability beginning at 1.59.1 is thus implicit throughout the *logos*. It is most emphatic, quite reasonably, in the account of Peisistratos' final, most successful bid for tyrannical power (1.61.3–64.3). Expelled from Athens a second time, Peisistratos quit Attika altogether, first retiring to Eretria and, from there, moving north to Thrace.<sup>15</sup> (Herodotos does not mention that movement initially, but alludes to it later in passing [1.64.1]; it is stated explicitly in the *Ath. Pol.* [15.2].) At all events, according to Herodotos, Peisistratos resolved from the beginning to return to Athens and to reacquire the tyranny. To that end, he travelled to the Strymon flank of Mount Pangaion, where he obtained rights to the mines and worked them with his sons and adherents for some time, perhaps the

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Bornitz (n. 6), pp. 12–13; and W. R. Connor, 'Tribes, Festivals and Processions: Civic Ceremonial and Political Manipulation in Archaic Greece', *JHS* 107 (1987), 40–50, pp. 42–7. There is further example of this theme in the *Ath. Pol.* (15.4–5), where Peisistratos is credited with disarming the Athenians by trickery. It is possible that the story was known in Herodotos' time, since Thucydides may have been correcting it by making Hippias perpetrator of a similar stratagem (658.2: cf. K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, iv [Oxford, 1970], pp. 335–6; P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the 'Aristoteleian' Athenaion Politeia* [Oxford, 1981], p. 210).

<sup>11</sup> For another example of divinely inspired intelligence cf. Ael. *NA* 7.8 on Anaxagoras at Olympia.

<sup>12</sup> On the connection of Peisistratos to Herakles: see especially J. Boardman (n. 9); 'Herakles, Peisistratos and Eleusis', *JHS* 95 (1975), 1–12. Boardman, whose views (and such) have been recently criticized by Cook (n. 9), answers in 'Herakles, Peisistratos and the Unconvinced', *JHS* 109 (1989), 158–9 with special reference to the Athena-Phye ruse. On the Odysseus-connection: cf. G. F. Else, 'The Origin of *Tragoidia*', *Hermes* 85 (1957), 17–46, pp. 36–9; Connor (n. 10), p. 43.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Connor (n. 10), pp. 40ff. (although Cook [n. 9], p. 168 n. 17 offers objection); cf. also J. W. Blakesley, *Herodotus*, i (London, 1854), p. 42 n. 201; and H. A. Shapiro, 'Poseidon and the Tuna', *AC* 58 (1989), 32–43 (especially pp. 42–3) for a different view of the pageant, Amphylos' verses, and divine patronage-propaganda. I thank Dr. P. Rehak for this reference.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Solon Fr. 4 (West), 11.3–4; cf. Else (n. 12), p. 37; Connor (n. 10), pp. 45ff.

<sup>15</sup> Hdt. 1.61.2; *Ath. Pol.* 15.2; cf. H. Drexler, *Herodot-Studien* (Hildesheim, 1972), p. 165; J. R. Cole, 'Peisistratos on the Strymon', *G&R* 22 (1975), 42–4; Didiers Viviers, 'Peisistratos' settlement on the Thermaic Gulf: a connection with the Eretrian colonization', *JHS* 107 (1987), 193–5.

greater number of his years in exile.<sup>16</sup> From all indications, the Peisistratids amassed considerable amounts of gold and silver, then returned to Eretria where they continued to acquire wealth from their allies.<sup>17</sup> A 'great many (of these) supplied money', among whom (implicitly in Herodotos) were the Eretrian *hippeis* whose city was base for Peisistratos and his party (1.61.2; cf. *Ath. Pol.* 15.2), (explicitly) the Thebans who surpassed all in contributions (1.61.3), and Lygdamis of Naxos (1.61.4).

Peisistratos also set to collecting an army with which to invade Attika, and in this endeavour once again obtained assistance from his allies. To forces already assembled at Eretria, his own and whatever he could muster there, were added the Argives (1.61.4) and Naxians (1.64.1). The author of the *Ath. Pol.*, who offers valid supplementary information for the period, states that the Thebans, Lygdamis of Naxos and the Eretrians were all rather fervent in their support of Peisistratos' enterprise, the implication being that the Thebans and Eretrians also offered armed contingents (15.2). If we can judge at all from the testimony of *Ath. Pol.* about the size of these contingents, Peisistratos' army at Eretria reached considerable proportions well before it embarked for Attika: the Argives alone are said (17.4) to have provided a 'thousand' men, while, in addition to the allies assembled there, Peisistratos apparently brought with him from Thrace some paid fighters (15.2).<sup>18</sup> Even on the testimony of Herodotos, the force assembled at Euboia was quite formidable, consisting as it did of so many allies.

When Peisistratos landed and encamped at Marathon, even more men and money came to him from Attika, for Herodotos (1.62.1) states that '*stasiōtai* from the city arrived and others from the demes streamed in, to whom tyranny was more agreeable than freedom.' The former were very likely meant to denote the city-enemies of the Alkmaionidai, since, at Pallene, the Alkmaionidai considered themselves notably opposed to Peisistratos (1.64.3); the latter were Peisistratos' mostly Diakrian partisans. The old tyrant was apparently very popular among the rural demesmen, undoubtedly because he was a neighbour and a 'favourite son', and his motives for putting in at Marathon must have been partially dictated by his desire to increase the number of his partisans.<sup>19</sup> By the time Peisistratos took the road for Athens, his force, on paper so to speak, was overwhelming.

Or, at least, that is impression we are meant to derive at this point in the narrative. By using the same or similar words repeatedly to describe the periodic infusions of money (*δωρίνας* [61.3]; *χρήματα* [61.3 *bis*, 61.4, 62.2]) and fighting men (*μισθωτοί* [61.4]; *άνδρας* [61.4]; *στασιώται* [62.1]) to Peisistratos' forces, Herodotos seems to animate their growth, progressively inflating the strength of the tyrant from the time of his arrival at Eretria to Pallene, as, say, one might blow air into a balloon. The army that began in Thrace, increased at Eretria and then continued to increase on Euboia, enlarged even more when it moved to Attika. Oppositely, inferentially, the forces of the 'men of the city' remained static while Peisistratos was encamped at Eretria, shrank when some of the Athenians themselves defected. The impression is

<sup>16</sup> The information that Hippias was the prime force in creating the resolve to return to Athens and to retake the tyranny is surely an invention of the fifth century, perhaps directly based upon Hippias' own iron will to power which he demonstrated amply at Marathon in extreme old age (Hdt. 6.107.2-3; cf. Bornitz [n. 6], pp. 14-16; Drexler [n. 15], pp. 211-12).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Hdt. 1.64.1; *Ath. Pol.* 15.2.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. J. G. P. Best, *Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare* (Groningen, 1969), pp. 5ff.; M. F. Vos, *Scythian Archers in Archaic Attic Vase-Painting* (Groningen, 1963), pp. 65ff.

<sup>19</sup> Could Peisistratos also have been influenced to come to land at Marathon by factors which favoured the Eretrian *hippeis*? Cf. Hdt. 6.102 on the consideration of good ground for cavalry by the Persians or Hippias; cf. also How and Wells (n. 3), ii.361-2.

underscored in Herodotos' report that the men of the city did nothing while Peisistratos was on Euboia or even when he landed and encamped at Marathon. Only when the Peisistratids moved from Marathon did the Athenians of the city bestir themselves. It must be observed, however, that the impression Herodotos means to create is not so much that the Athenians were inept as overmatched, and that, by the time the city forces had marched out to Pallene, the odds against them – the ultimate blow to them is that they were even fighting against considerable numbers of their fellow countrymen – were already too great, already were portending destruction.

It is at this point in Herodotos' narrative that Amphilytos issues his *chrēsmos* and the lost cause of the Athenians is put beyond doubt. The metaphorical equivalents and the meaning of the verses are as clear to us as they would have been to any Greek in Herodotos' audience: the Athenians are the 'tunnies'; Peisistratos and his forces are the 'fishermen'; and Amphilytos, of course, is the 'tunny-watcher' or 'hooper' (*θυνοσκόπος*) whose instructions to the 'fishermen' determine the success or failure of the enterprise (see below).<sup>20</sup> However, the fuller purport of the oracle, the theme of Peisistratos' irresistibility and Herodotos' own method in relating and crafting the story of how Peisistratos came to power and kept it, comes into sharper, more vivid focus if we consider the verses in light of ancient Greek tunny-fishing.

The consensus among ancient authors was that the taking of the tunny was a thoroughly uncomplicated operation for Greek fishermen, entirely in their favour, owing partly to the unusually cooperative behaviour of the rather stupid and spiritless fish and partly to the intellectual superiority of their human hunters.<sup>21</sup> Tunnies habitually swim straight for fishermen's nets without altering course, a fact which has led in modern times to the development of such sophisticated *abattoirs* as the Italian *camera della morte*. Once in the *camera*, the helpless fish are clubbed or speared and hauled aboard in vast numbers just as they were in antiquity: Philostratos (*Eik.* 1.13 [315k.11–15]) describes the bounty resulting from tunny-fishing: 'At a loss as to how they will use so many fishes, the fishermen open their nets and allow some to get away and escape. To such a degree are they enriched by their haul.'<sup>22</sup>

Although ancient Greeks had no such *camere*, they were nevertheless greatly aided by the tunnies. Once encompassed in the net, according to Aelian (*NA* 15.5), the fishes went still in the water, incapable of any action, least of all resistance: the timidity of the fish was renowned.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, although the tunnies could become frenzied, even their frenzy worked for the fishermen. Oppian states that the fishes were impelled into the nets in their numbers either by madness resulting from a pestilential infestation (*Hal.* 2.506–20) or by their own witlessness (3.596–604). They would, at times, jump into the very boats of the fisherman. Their folly, too, was renowned.<sup>24</sup> Beyond these disadvantages and infirmities, the tunny was also thought to be poor in eyesight, favouring the right eye, and assumed to be all but blind in the

<sup>20</sup> Blakesley (n. 13), p. 44 n. 211 unnecessarily belabours the apportionment of roles in the prophecy by taking Amphilytos' words much too literally, as applying to conditions and displacements obtaining at Pallene at the time of the battle. That is certainly not Herodotos' point, since his account of the battle is in every other way vague, not precise or detailed.

<sup>21</sup> Plin. *NH* 9.18–21; Ael. *NA* 15.5–6; Opp. *Hal.* 3.620–48; Philos. *Eik.* 1.13; cf. Arist. *HA* 4.10 (537a). Modern literature: Thompson (n. 1), pp. 79–90; and Radcliffe (n. 1), pp. 99–105. Cf. also A. Steier, *RE* 7, A, 1, 720–33, s.v. *thynnos*; P. Rhode, *De Thynnorum Captura* (Leipzig, 1890) and 'Thynnorum captura', *Jahrb. f. class. Philol.* 18 Suppl. (1892), 1–79, apparently definitive for ancient Greek tunny-fishing (cf. Radcliffe's amusingly exasperated comment [p. 101 n. 1]), were unavailable to me in any form.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Opp. *Hal.* 3.645–8; cf. also Ael. *NH* 15.10 (on the pelamyd).

<sup>23</sup> Ovid, *Hal.* 98; Plin. *NH* 9.51; Opp. *Hal.* 4.562ff. (on pelamys).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Luc. *Jupp. Trag.* 25 (*θυνώδης*).

left.<sup>25</sup> It was because the tunny was so regular in its habits, so stupid and infirm, and thus so easily taken and in such great numbers that Oppian termed the tunny the natural prey of Greek fishermen.<sup>26</sup> In fact, ancient Greek tunny-fishing was so one-sided and unsporting that even the landlubbing Boiotian Plutarch decried it calling it αἰσχρόν.<sup>27</sup>

What provided the ancient fishermen's absolute superiority over the tunny was intelligence and, in particular, the special knowledge of the hooer. Philostratos (*Eik.* 1.13 [= 314k.22–3] says that the *thynnoskopos* is 'quick at numbering' and 'sharp of eye', and Aelian (*NA* 15.5) that he is possessed of a 'certain *sophia*' which is ἀπόρρητος. Aelian's pronouncement undoubtedly reflects common Greek opinion that the tunny-watcher's exceptional talent derived from a special source, an opinion which many Greeks in Herodotos' time must have shared. In earlier times, the source of the tunny-watcher's skill would surely have been reckoned supernatural or even divine.<sup>28</sup>

In Aelian, the *thynnoskopos* gives orders 'just as a general would' (ὥσπερ οὖν στρατηγός), an example of military imagery not infrequently applied to tunny-fishing. The reverse image, soldiers or sailors described as tunnies, may be evident as early as Homer, but was certainly known to the Athenians in the early fifth century B.C.<sup>29</sup> In Aeschylus' *Persai* (424–6), the Greeks strike and cut at the routed Persians at Salamis with splinters of oars and fragments of the wrecks 'as (they would) tunnies or some other cast of fishes' (ὥστε θύννους ἢ τιν' ἰχθύων βόλον). As the tunny, the enemy has no chance of survival; they offer no resistance and are slaughtered in vast numbers.<sup>30</sup>

To return to Herodotos, the Athenians in Amphilytos' verses are 'tunnies' who, from the moment the verses are uttered, are sealed in their fate. They simply have no chance against the sooth of the 'tunny-watcher', Amphilytos, or the skill of the god-favoured 'fisherman', Peisistratos and his considerable army 'crew'.<sup>31</sup> Amphilytos' ultimate 'directions' before the battle inform Peisistratos that the Athenians are already completely defeated: they will be taken effortlessly and in great numbers as they 'rush headlong' into the 'nets' once they are 'awakened' in the 'moonlit' night.<sup>32</sup> They are defeated not by action, but by their quietude and seeming indifference to the peril facing them. Their *apparent* foolishness, being caught unawares either sleeping or playing at draughts, assured their swift and easy destruction. Together with Herodotos' description of Peisistratos' military and financial stockpiling and the implication that the Athenian forces are shrinking, the overwhelming impression we are meant to derive is that the Athenians were *utterly* finished before the battle was even joined.

<sup>25</sup> Arist. *HA* 598b, 19; Plin. *NH* 9.50 (cf. 9.56); cf. Plut. *Mor.* 979d–e.

<sup>26</sup> *Kyn.* 1.72.

<sup>27</sup> *Mor.* 966a [= *De Soll. Anim.* 9].

<sup>28</sup> Cf., for example, E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley, 1951), pp. 8ff., especially 13. See above n. 11.

<sup>29</sup> *Od.* 10.124; cf. K. Amies, comm. *Homers Odysee* (Leipzig, 1908), p. 110; W. F. Stanford, comm. *Homer. Odyssey*, i (London, 1947), p. 369 who alludes to the metaphor in Aeschylus' *Persai* 424–6. I thank Ms. Catherine Mardikes for these references and others.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Ar. *Knights* 313 where Kleon is described as a 'tunny-watcher of tribute'. cf. R. A. Neil, comm. *The Knights of Aristophanes* (Cambridge, 1909), pp. 49–50; cf. Ael. *NH* 9.42. Aelian (*NH* 15.5) lists Herodotos among other authorities on tunny-fishing.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. How and Wells (n. 3), i.84–5 (on 1.62.4).

<sup>32</sup> I should think that an allusion to night-fishing is the only means to explain the phrase σεληναίης διὰ νυκτός adequately, since the Athenians were actually surprised in the full light of the early afternoon. Williams' attempt to make the oracle precisely parallel to the conditions of the Athenian fighters (playing at dice, sleeping) (n. 1) is not creditable.

Herodotos' account does not end, however, with Amphilytos' 'tunny-watching' prophecy; rather there is a transference to or perhaps a sharing of his 'mysterious' power with Peisistratos. In any case, Peisistratos becomes the 'hooer/fisherman' as Amphilytos is made not to realize the purport of his own prophecy, at least not in Herodotos: it is not for him to interpret his pronouncement, but for Peisistratos to ken its meaning and to act. Peisistratos' quick intelligence is demonstrated once more as he instantly grasps the oracle and acts upon it.<sup>33</sup> In conformance with Amphilytos' utterances, but his own interpretations, Peisistratos attacks at once, catching the Athenians 'asleep' (as the verses all but said they would be), and putting them to rout. There was no battle at all and the Athenians abandoned the field pell mell – in Herodotos, without ever striking a blow. This initial scene in Herodotos contrasts not only with Andokides' garbled memory of Pallene (1.106), but also with Herodotos' later report (1.64.3) that some Athenians, offering resistance, fell in battle. In his account leading up to the Athenian defeat at Pallene, however, Herodotos obviously intended to emphasize only the factors responsible for Peisistratos' irresistibility, his divine patronage and intelligence, for he was concerned with impression, not detail and that is why his account is as vague as it is. The facts simply mattered less than their interpretation.

Peisistratos' superior intelligence is evidenced once more in his securing a way into Athens without further molestation to himself, his forces, or to the Athenians. According to Herodotos, once he understood that the field was his, Peisistratos 'devised most wisely' (1.63.2) by sending his sons on horseback to overtake the fleeing 'men of the city'. His design was to keep the fugitives from rallying at all to oppose his entry into the city. Consequently, Peisistratos commanded his sons to tell the fleeing Athenians to be of good cheer and go directly home. This accomplished, the Athenians confined each to his own home, and Athens taken, Peisistratos' tyranny was reestablished and firmly secured without further bloodshed. Peisistratos was not acrimonious, although he certainly had the chance to exact revenge from the vulnerable fugitives.

Thus, in Herodotos' account, the combination of divine patronage and divinely-inspired intellect makes Peisistratos invincible to the Athenians. Amphilytos' prophecy is the most prominent element in that theme of supernatural assistance for Peisistratos; it and Peisistratos' correct interpretation of it are the final notes in Herodotos' dirge of hopeless resistance to the tyranny. Amphilytos' words, as Chilon's, constitute an unerring message of doom pronounced upon the Athenian resisters even before they had lifted a weapon. To have achieved victory against such odds as Peisistratos had mounted against them, even to have considered resisting was contrary to reason, contrary to the will of the divine, which was obviously on the side of Peisistratos and had been even before he was born. The Athenians' ineptitude, relaxing after their midday meal instead of standing to arms, is only apparent and meant to be occluded by this message of futility: they were simply playing out what had been ordained by the gods. What could they do? How possibly could they be blamed for what happened at Pallene or for the tyranny?<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> See n. 3.

<sup>34</sup> Shame for the defeat at Pallene accounts for the bald revisions of Andokides (1.106). (Cf. Rhodes [n. 10], pp. 208–9; J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families, 600–300 B.C.* [Oxford, 1971], pp. 27–8; the views of A. E. Raubitschek, 'Zu attischen Genealogie', *RhM* 98 [1955], 258–62; and D. M. MacDowell, *Andokides. On the Mysteries* [Oxford, 1962], pp. 212–13 I find unconvincing, especially because neither of two adequately accounts for Pallene as a site of battle between Athenians and Spartans or Spartan sympathizers.)

The purport of the oracle-story is clear, but the substance of Herodotos' entire *logos*, amounting to a concatenation of oracles and tricks overgilded by the implication of divine favour, was certainly not preserved by Peisistratid partisans, the obvious beneficiaries, to be repeated in Herodotos' markedly Athenocentric *Histories*. Nor was it kept by the democratic Athenians to flatter Peisistratos or merely to suggest that tyranny was always and everywhere god-sponsored or even a good thing. It cannot have been related to Herodotos for further publication among the Athenians themselves and for wider publication among the Greeks because it made the Athenians appear ridiculous. All of that must surely be ruled out. Yet, the primary source and audience for Herodotos' account of Peisistratos' rise to power must have been the Athenians and it is their reasons for keeping and relating its elements to the historian which must account for the story's presence in the *Histories*.

In fact, we have no great distance to go to discover that motivation. The Athenians of the later fifth century were dedicated antityrannists who had outlawed the Peisistratids. They may well have expected much more of their ancestors in the way of resistance to the tyranny than was evident from the record. It was surely a source of anger and embarrassment to them ever to have been governed by tyrants, especially those who had helped the Persians to devastate Athens and Attika, aiding them in burning the city and its temples on the Akropolis. The revisionistic theme of Peisistratos' irresistibility helped to explain better why Athens came to be ruled by the tyrants in the first place and to forgive the Athenians both for succumbing to the tyranny and for enduring it as long as it lasted. It is flattering revision which makes the odds against the 'men of the city', who, in the minds of the fifth-century Athenians, stood for them, great before Peisistratos landed at Marathon, but insuperable when Amphilytos uttered his prophetic verses just before the battle of Pallene. It stops just short of asserting that to fight Peisistratos was foolishly to war against divinity. For their actions (or inactions) regarding Peisistratid tyranny, in their own eyes and in those of the rest of the Greeks, the Athenians could not be blamed for Pallene or for the tyranny, for they, as any other Greeks would have been, had been completely caught out by a cleverer, indeed divinely-inspired 'angler'.

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